How a fast lane may replace a congestion toll

Abstract

This paper considers a congested bottleneck. A fast lane reserves a more than proportional share of capacity to a designated group of travellers. Travellers are otherwise identical and other travellers can use the reserved capacity when it would otherwise be idle. The paper shows that such a fast lane is always Pareto improving under Nash equilibrium in arrival times at the bottleneck and inelastic demand. It can replicate the arrival schedule and queueing outcomes of a toll that optimally charges a constant toll during part of the demand peak. Within some bounds, the fast lane scheme is still welfare improving when demand is elastic.

Document type: Book

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The different versions of the original document can be found in:

• http://orbit.dtu.dk/getResource?recordId=275783&objectId=1&versionId=1

• https://backend.orbit.dtu.dk/ws/files/5505566/fastlane_final.pdf

• https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42271/1/MPRA_paper_42271.pdf

• http://orbit.dtu.dk/en/publications/how-a-fast-lane-may-replace-a-congestion-toll(20edbfe8-f50e-4383-be05-e3dfba284eee).html,http://orbit.dtu.dk/ws/files/5505566/fastlane_final.pdf