Investigation of a Masking Countermeasure against Side-Channel Attacks for RISC-based Processor Architectures

Abstract

Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) present a serious threat to the security of crypto-systems. In this paper, we show how a pipelined embedded processor opens the door to such attacks. To illustrate our approach, a concrete evaluation of the Xilinx’s MicroBlaze soft-core processor is conducted. From these results, we suggest a new masking countermeasure suited for RISC-based architectures. The efficiency and limits of the proposed solution are finally evaluated.

Original document

The different versions of the original document can be found in:

• https://hal-lirmm.ccsd.cnrs.fr/lirmm-00548802

• http://xplorestaging.ieee.org/ielx5/5690273/5694025/05694234.pdf?arnumber=5694234,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/fpl.2010.35

• https://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/fpl/fpl2010.html#BartheBT10,

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5694234,

http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.ieee-000005694234,

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5694234,

https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2120195958