Latest revision as of 09:43, 15 February 2021

Abstract

Growth in environmental sustainability has prompted the logistics industry to seek sustainable development, and carbon tax policies are considered an effective approach to reducing carbon emissions. This study investigates the optimization of sustainable transportation and inventory under a carbon tax policy and explores effective methods for coordinating the interests of governments and enterprises. The results can provide insights into sustainable logistics for decision-making by enterprises and policy-making by governments. We first examine a Stackelberg game model and design an iterative solution to optimize sustainable transportation and inventory under the carbon tax policy. We then establish a three-stage dynamic game model to optimize the wholesale price, carbon tax rate, and proportion of sustainable investment shared by the government. Furthermore, we perform a simulation to identify the optimal solution of the three-stage game, and we compare the simulation results with a numerical example. The results indicate that a carbon tax policy can improve social welfare and the sustainability of transportation and inventory but could hinder corporate profits. An appropriate sustainable investment-sharing strategy could compensate for the shortcomings of the carbon tax policy and result in positive outcomes for governments and enterprises.

Document type: Article

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The different versions of the original document can be found in:

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/4948383 under the license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

• https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/4948383

• http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2020/4948383.pdf,

http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2020/4948383.xml,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/4948383 under the license cc-by

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/4948383,

https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X,

https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 under the license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

• https://www.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2020/4948383,

http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/mpe/2020/4948383.pdf,

https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/3037582244