Latest revision as of 16:25, 1 February 2021

Abstract

Traditionally, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) make profit by providing Internet connectivity, while content providers (CPs) play the more lucrative role of delivering content to users. As network connectivity is increasingly a commodity, ISPs have a strong incentive to offer content to their subscribers by deploying their own content distribution infrastructure. Providing content services in a provider network presents new opportunities for coordination between server selection (to match servers with subscribers) and traffic engineering (to select efficient routes for the traffic). In this work, we utilize a mathematical framework to show that separating server selection and traffic engineering leads to a sub-optimal equilibrium, even when the CP is given accurate and timely information about network conditions. Leveraging ideas from cooperative game theory, we propose that the system implements a Nash bargaining solution that significantly improves the fairness and efficiency of the joint system. This study is another step toward a systematic understanding of the interactions between those who generate and distribute content and those who provide and operate networks.

Original document

The different versions of the original document can be found in:

• http://dl.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id=1403030&type=pdf

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403030

• http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2008/workshops/netecon/papers/p7.pdf,

https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrex/papers/netecon08.pdf,

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http://netecon.seas.harvard.edu/NetEcon08/Papers/jiang_08.pdf,

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https://collaborate.princeton.edu/en/publications/cooperative-content-distribution-and-traffic-engineering,

https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2148580155

• http://dl.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id=1403030&ftid=524288&dwn=1,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1403027.1403030