Latest revision as of 00:26, 29 January 2021

Abstract

One of the major issues in the design of the concepts-of-operations for NEXTGEN is the equitable allocation of overscheduled National Airspace System (NAS) resources. Although federal regulations, Congressional policies, and modernization plans call for equitable allocation of publicly held resources, the mechanisms for equitable allocation, and the tradeoffs that must be made between stakeholders, exhibit a high degree of social, political, and economic complexity. Further, the allocations that are routinely made in Traffic Flow Management (TFM) and Air Traffic Control (ATC) are subject to widespread perceptions of systemic inequity and economic inefficiency. This paper describes the properties associated with the dynamic allocation of an overscheduled resource. The mathematical model demonstrates that (i) a natural equity asymmetry exists in the first-scheduled/firstallocated mechanism, (ii) this asymmetry results in a low probability (< 10%) of an equitable allocation of resources amongst groups of flights (e.g. airlines), and (iii) increased competition reduces the likelihood of equitable allocations. These theoretical results establish the "feasible space" in which claims of equity can be made, suggests refinements of the existing allocation schemes, and establishes the framework for a regulatory role in proposed market-based mechanisms.

Original document

The different versions of the original document can be found in:

• http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3c46/0e8921cb959e934f0d84a06aa6f77ff54c7e.pdf

• http://arc.aiaa.org/doi/pdf/10.2514/6.2009-6919,

http://dx.doi.org/10.2514/6.2009-6919

• https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/10.2514/6.2009-6919,

https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2325015185