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In order realistically and cost-effectively to realize the ATM (Air Traffic Management) 2000+ Strategy, systems from different suppliers will be interconnected to form a complete functional and operational environment, covering ground segments and aerospace. Industry will be involved as early as possible in the lifecycle of ATM projects. EUROCONTROL manages the processes that involve the definition and validation of new ATM solutions using Industry capabilities (e.g., SMEs). In practice, safety analyses adapt and reuse system design models (produced by third parties). Technical, organisational and cost-related reasons often determine this choice, although design models are unfit for safety analysis. Design models provide limited support to safety analysis, because they are tailored for system designers. The definition of an adequate model and of an underlying methodology for its construction will be highly beneficial for whom is performing safety analyses. Limited budgets and resources, often, constrain or inhibit the model definition phase as an integral part of safety analysis. This paper is concerned with problems in modeling ATM systems for safety analysis. The main objective is to highlight a model specifically targeted to support evolutionary safety analysis. | In order realistically and cost-effectively to realize the ATM (Air Traffic Management) 2000+ Strategy, systems from different suppliers will be interconnected to form a complete functional and operational environment, covering ground segments and aerospace. Industry will be involved as early as possible in the lifecycle of ATM projects. EUROCONTROL manages the processes that involve the definition and validation of new ATM solutions using Industry capabilities (e.g., SMEs). In practice, safety analyses adapt and reuse system design models (produced by third parties). Technical, organisational and cost-related reasons often determine this choice, although design models are unfit for safety analysis. Design models provide limited support to safety analysis, because they are tailored for system designers. The definition of an adequate model and of an underlying methodology for its construction will be highly beneficial for whom is performing safety analyses. Limited budgets and resources, often, constrain or inhibit the model definition phase as an integral part of safety analysis. This paper is concerned with problems in modeling ATM systems for safety analysis. The main objective is to highlight a model specifically targeted to support evolutionary safety analysis. | ||
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* [http://www.dirc.org.uk/publications/inproceedings/papers/137.pdf http://www.dirc.org.uk/publications/inproceedings/papers/137.pdf] | * [http://www.dirc.org.uk/publications/inproceedings/papers/137.pdf http://www.dirc.org.uk/publications/inproceedings/papers/137.pdf] | ||
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+ | * [http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/11563228_16.pdf http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/11563228_16.pdf], | ||
+ | : [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11563228_16 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11563228_16] | ||
+ | |||
+ | * [http://www.dirc.org.uk/publications/inproceedings/papers/137.pdf http://www.dirc.org.uk/publications/inproceedings/papers/137.pdf], | ||
+ | : [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F11563228_16 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F11563228_16], | ||
+ | : [https://core.ac.uk/display/20688567 https://core.ac.uk/display/20688567], | ||
+ | : [https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2156666 https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2156666], | ||
+ | : [https://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/safecomp/safecomp2005.html#Felici05 https://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/safecomp/safecomp2005.html#Felici05], | ||
+ | : [https://doi.org/10.1007/11563228_16 https://doi.org/10.1007/11563228_16], | ||
+ | : [https://rd.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11563228_16 https://rd.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11563228_16], | ||
+ | : [https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2123946277 https://academic.microsoft.com/#/detail/2123946277] |
In order realistically and cost-effectively to realize the ATM (Air Traffic Management) 2000+ Strategy, systems from different suppliers will be interconnected to form a complete functional and operational environment, covering ground segments and aerospace. Industry will be involved as early as possible in the lifecycle of ATM projects. EUROCONTROL manages the processes that involve the definition and validation of new ATM solutions using Industry capabilities (e.g., SMEs). In practice, safety analyses adapt and reuse system design models (produced by third parties). Technical, organisational and cost-related reasons often determine this choice, although design models are unfit for safety analysis. Design models provide limited support to safety analysis, because they are tailored for system designers. The definition of an adequate model and of an underlying methodology for its construction will be highly beneficial for whom is performing safety analyses. Limited budgets and resources, often, constrain or inhibit the model definition phase as an integral part of safety analysis. This paper is concerned with problems in modeling ATM systems for safety analysis. The main objective is to highlight a model specifically targeted to support evolutionary safety analysis.
The different versions of the original document can be found in:
Published on 01/01/2005
Volume 2005, 2005
DOI: 10.1007/11563228_16
Licence: CC BY-NC-SA license
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